Safeguarding SA: The Impact of Intelligence Reforms on National Security

A warehouse in Durban was burnt and items looted during the July 2021 unrest. The events of July 2021 are a stark reminder of our shortcomings in forecasting, preventing, and effectively managing significant escalations in civil unrest, says the writer.

A warehouse in Durban was burnt and items looted during the July 2021 unrest. The events of July 2021 are a stark reminder of our shortcomings in forecasting, preventing, and effectively managing significant escalations in civil unrest, says the writer.

Image by: Doctor Ngcobo / Independent Newspapers

Published 19h ago

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Dr. Reneva Fourie

HEIGHTENED threats posed by the Israeli and United States governments have intensified the country’s vulnerabilities, raising serious concerns about national security.

Additionally, there are indications that some domestic entities may be collaborating with these foreign powers, which raises alarms about their intentions and the potential for undermining South Africa’s sovereignty and independence.

The changes in the geopolitical landscape require South Africa’s intelligence capabilities to be incisive and proactive.

On March 28, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed into law Act No. 37 of 2024: the General Intelligence Laws Amendment (GILA) Act, 2024. This legislation marks a substantial step towards reforming South Africa’s intelligence framework.

The GILA Act updates the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994, the Intelligence Services Act of 2002, and the Intelligence Services Oversight Act of 1994. It aims to tackle longstanding issues within the State Security Agency (SSA) and implement reforms recommended by various oversight bodies.

Among the recommendations considered were those of the High-Level Review Panel appointed by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018 and chaired by Dr Sydney Mufamadi. Its task was to assess the mandate, capacity, and integrity of the State Security Agency (SSA).

The panel released its findings in March 2019, highlighting several critical issues. One major concern was that the SSA had fallen victim to political interference and internal conflict, which led to operations straying from their constitutional mandates. Additionally, the agency operated with excessive secrecy due to insufficient oversight. 

The panel pointed out that merging the domestic and foreign intelligence services into the SSA created inefficiencies, concentrated power, and hindered focus on specific operational areas.

To improve effectiveness and accountability, the panel recommended separating these services, as had been the case at the beginning of the democratic era.

Public participation was also crucial in highlighting deficiencies in the past legislation and earlier versions of the GILA Bill and advocated for further refinements to uphold democratic values and protect citizens’ rights. 

The amendments brought about by the GILA Act mark a necessary step forward in clarifying ambiguities and strengthening oversight within South Africa’s intelligence framework.

By refining definitions and introducing judicial oversight for bulk surveillance, these changes address concerns related to overreach and potential abuses.

Additionally, the focus on parliamentary oversight concerning key appointments and budget allocations bolsters accountability mechanisms essential for protecting constitutional rights. These developments also align our intelligence sector with international best practices,  as well as the 2013 Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, known as the Tshwane Principles.

Moreover, the GILA Act redesigns the structure of our intelligence agencies by re-separating domestic and foreign intelligence, thus establishing the South African Intelligence Service (formerly SASS) and the South African Intelligence Agency (formerly NIA).

This legislation lays out a detailed framework for the National Communications Centre (NCC), which is vital in tackling national security threats.

It outlines the NCC’s key functions, such as the systematic collection of intelligence through intercepting various sources, meticulous verification of information to accurately identify potential threats, and the coordination of nationwide cybersecurity efforts to bolster our defences against cyber threats and enhance overall national security resilience. The Act also formalises the South African National Academy of Intelligence and strengthens the independence of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC) and the Office of the Inspector-General.

While the Act introduces important measures to enhance oversight, there is a need to further empower the Auditor-General, the Inspector-General of Intelligence, and Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence.

By strengthening their authority, we can improve the mechanisms to prevent mismanagement of secret funds. Enhancing these powers could lead to more effective accountability and transparency in this critical area. 

There have been concerns regarding the placement of intelligence operations within the Presidency. However, having intelligence, especially NICOC, under presidential control promotes effective coordination, particularly since the various intelligence services, including crime and military, are assigned to different ministers.

It is important to recognise that this arrangement is not unique; several countries, including Brazil, China, and France, also position their intelligence services directly under the head of state.

The GILA Act significantly advances reforming South Africa’s intelligence services. By addressing past shortcomings and incorporating feedback from oversight bodies and civil society, the Act offers the opportunity to create a more accountable, effective, and constitutionally aligned intelligence framework. It introduces several commendable provisions designed to boost clarity, oversight, and accountability within the system.

While the recent legislative amendments and enhancements to institutional frameworks are laudable advancements, developing a stronger human resource capacity is equally important.

The events of July 2021 are a stark reminder of our shortcomings in forecasting, preventing, and effectively managing significant escalations in civil unrest.

Despite the ongoing threats to state stability and authority, the absence of timely risk assessments was particularly evident during this period. This oversight highlights a fundamental issue within the institutional processes.

Although the information-gathering capabilities seem satisfactory, the quality of analysis needs improvement. Enhancing this capacity should centre on refining methodologies that better predict, understand, and mitigate potential threats before they escalate into crises.

Furthermore, persistent vigilance is essential. These reforms must be viewed not as singular initiatives but as a continual commitment to enhancing responsiveness and resilience in governance.

Only through sustained efforts and iterative refinements can we ensure that these reforms achieve their intended objectives, ultimately bolstering the security and stability of the state.

* Dr Reneva Fourie is a policy analyst specialising in governance, development and security and co-author of the book ‘The Art of Power: Pursuing Liberation and Nation-Building’.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media. 

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